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| Peace, Conflict Management and Human Rights: Conflict between India and Pakistan in disputed Kashmir |
| Written by Rubayat Ahsan | ||||
| Sunday, 21 September 2008 | ||||
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1. Introduction Where Marx believed that social class is the most basic division in any society, Max Weber saw conflict as having many possible bases religion, race, ethnicity, and more including social class. Where Marx believed that class inequalities would ultimately be ended by revolution, Weber saw conflict as eternal, although it could take new forms. Group conflict theory derives from Weber’s vision. Johan Galtung has come up with more concrete and specific expression about conflict, which is in fact fitted in the case of Kashmir conflict. Galtung (1998) has showed how conflict arises, “…goals may be incompatible and mutually exclusive, like two states wanting the same land, or two nations wanting the same state when goals are incompatible, a contradiction, an issue, is born… frustration may lead to aggression, turning inwards as attitudes of hatred, or outwards as behaviour of verbal or physical violence…”. Thus Galtung has drawn a triangle of contradiction, attitude and behavior centering a conflict. India and Pakistan both claims Kashmir, which originated the conflict. The 55 years long conflict has not yet been resolved, on the other hand it has intensified hatred between Indian and Pakistanis that can be termed as Galtung’s ‘attitude of hatred’ transformed from long lasting frustration. The bilateral dialogues between leaders of both countries had failed numerous times to reach at peaceful decision and resolution. The leaders of both countries have encountered each other with words of threat and by act of violence as well as exercised military power, tested nuclear weapons and missiles. The arm race and the cross boarder conflict between India and Pakistan to threat each other can be compared as Galtung’s ‘behaviour of verbal or physical violence’. India and Pakistan has enemy image for each other. They exert enmity though the conflict behavior e.g. action, threat, cross boarder shelling, hatred speech etc. Kashmir fell in trouble because of the two-nation theory that was stimulated by the divided Muslim and Hindu leaders during partition at 1947. Muslim leaders felt for an independent state for Muslims as they realized that they would not receive freedom under a Hindu headed state. The two-nation theory is reasonable as it helps us to know source of Kashmir conflict. Kashmir conflict can also be defined as cultural and political conflict. Singh (1998: 320) has emphasized on cultural identity as he says, “…the ways in which each state’s respective relationship to the institutions of the Indian central state has served as the focal point for the creation and maintenance of cultural identity…”. Government of India has dominated ethnic and religious minorities to sustain on one cultural identity though the state has secular image in the outer surface. But the word ‘cultural conflict’ needs deliberately further investigation to adjust at Kashmir conflict because the world ‘culture’ has a set of different elements, which may have complex relations among each other. In my opinion, the concept of religious conflict is acceptable as a reason of origin of the conflict. In addition, Kashmir is now interstate political issue between India and Pakistan; the conflict in Kashmir also falls under intrastate conflict category. Kashmir was an issue of international politics during decade long cold war era while the two nuclear power of today was supported by the two super power of cold war era.
2. Background Mehta (2003:1) has explained the link between partition of India with today’s conflict on the line of control, “by the time the British abandoned India in 1947, their politics of “divide and rule” had effectively polarized the Hindu and Muslim populations…more than a million people died in the greatest migration in history, as Muslims from India headed to Pakistan and Pakistan was emptied of its Hindus and Sikhs…but the Hindu maharaja, who ruled over the Muslim majority, vacillated until an invasion by Pakistani irregulars convinced him to join India….the average Kashmiri now lives like a tongue between teeth, in a balance of terror between the security forces and the Islamic militants…”. India has never accepted U.N. resolution for the plebiscite. In fact, India is quite sure that the accepting plebiscite means loosing the territory, as the Kashmiris prefer Pakistan. But the majority Kashmiris desire independence. India does not feel it necessary to consider U.N. proposed plebiscite because Kashmiris have voted in national elections in India; there is no need for a plebiscite according to Indian government. Pakistan always says that a plebiscite should be held. Several of the militant groups in Kashmir have also called for a plebiscite but argue that an independent Kashmir should be an option. On July 2, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accord, under which both countries agreed to respect the cease-fire line, known as the Line of Control. Since 1996, Indian forces have got control over major towns and villages of the Kashmir valley, militant groups have occupied far northern and southern borders of Kashmir, including the districts of Rajouri, Punch, and Doda. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was weakened later on by the continuous efforts of Indian government. The remaining groups, most of which have close ties to Pakistan, have been largely driven to the more remote mountain areas of Doda and other southern districts.
Kashmir is a legendarily beautiful mountainous regi Muslim-majority Valley of Kashmir is under Indian administration, along with Hindu majority Jammu and predominantly Buddhist Ladakh. Two other parts, both of them entirely Muslim, are under Pakistani administration, and some largely unpopulated areas are currently ruled by China.
3.1 Conflict parties
a) India
4. Conflict Mapping Party A (India)
Needs Party B (Kashmiri Muslims)
Needs
Fear Party C (Pakistan)
Needs
4.2. Conflict trees
Conflict issues in Kashmir are, Causes for the Kashmir conflict are,
- Accession signed in October 1947 by the Maharaja, Hari Singh that was not the choice of majority people in Kashmir
The effects of conflicts are,
Pakistan naturally sympathizes with Muslims across Shuja (2004: 3) shows how India has built a close relation with Russia for developing its military capacity, “…it is interesting to note that India continues to develop its nuclear arms program with foreign assistance, mainly from Russia…India also continues to modernize its armed forces through ‘advanced conventional weapons’, mostly from Russia. New Delhi received its first two MiG-21-93 fighter aircraft, and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd will now begin the licensed upgrading of 123 more aircraft”. On the other hand Pakistan was in close military ties with U.S. during the cold war, which kept balance of power between India-Pakistan in the South Asia. Mr. Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is very much concerned about its popularity among the majority Hindus in India. Anti Muslim, fundamental image helped these political parties to win election in India. These political parties have different political ideologies but in case of Kashmir conflict they are united. Political leaders of India are waved by the strong nationalism, which does not permit separatism in Kashmir. BJP now relies more heavily on the support of fundamentalist and militant Hindus. The BJP leaders often mention at their statement and speeches that they will teach Pakistan a lesson on Kashmir issue. BJP wants to project itself as a true nationalist force. Any compromise or good decision for the future of Kashmiris is unthinkable for the sake of nationalism. Some Fundamental Hindu leaders and their followers in BJP exert enmity with Kashmiris as well as with Pakistanis. Conflict relation lines:
India has a broken relation with China following the dispute, which led to a war between them in 1962 and is still officially unresolved. China had occupied a small part of the Kashmir during the war and till today they have full control over their occupied portion. India has bitter relation with both China and Pakistan but Pakistan has very good relation with China since partition. Muslim United Front (MUF) attracted the support of a broad range of Kashmiris, including pro-independence activists, disenchanted Kashmiri youth and the pro-Pakistan Jama’at-i Islami (an Islamic political organization), militant groups who increasingly crossed over to Pakistan for arms and training, the JKLF and other groups. In late 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of the leaders of all the political and militant organizations, acted as the political voice of the independence movement. Major militant organizations fighting in Kashmir included the Hizb-ul Mujahidin, Harakat-ul Ansar and Lashgar-i Toiba receive moral support from Pakistan. Indian forces announced a unilateral ceasefire against militant groups in November 2000, but violence continued. Separatists demand that Pakistan should be included in any dialogue between them and the government. India disagrees with demand as Pakistan motivates cross boarder violence. Indian government had brutally and strategically destroyed the unity of all groups working for political voice for the independence in Kashmir. Insurgency is turned as the only path for independence when the political process failed. Central government forces are operating Kashmir that includes the Indian Army and India’s federal security forces, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the Border Security Force (BSF). Rashtriya Rifles, an elite army unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. Indian security forces began training local auxiliary forces made up of surrendered or captured militants to assist in counterinsurgency operations. India is committed to destroy any kind of initiatives that may have the purpose of separation of Kashmir. There has been massive international pressure on both Delhi and Islamabad to resolve the crisis, including US, the EU and others. The UN has maintained a presence in the disputed area since 1949. Currently, the LOC is monitored by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). UN role is not much significant in mediating conflict in Kashmir as its success is not remarkable including its monitoring over the line of control.
5. Current events and behavior of the parties
The attack in the Indian parliament in New Delhi on December 13,
2001 has raised the conspiracy theory between the two nations. India
said that Pakistan has a connection with the terrorists who attacked
the Parliament. Pakistan denied any connection. India deployed more
than a million troops, backed by heavy artillery and air power, along
the 2880 kilometer Line of Control. As India threatened war, Pakistan
declared its readiness to combat war situation. About one million troops have been employed. These forces on both sides of the line are engaged in firing and shelling against each other in a regular fashion. Both countries are now powered by nuclear weapon, which is a big threat for spreading violence and power imbalance in South Asia. Even tough some critics assume there is no chance of nuclear devastation by any of these countries; 55 years Kashmir conflict insisted these nations to develop nuclear weapon for encountering threat from each other. Pakistan’s intention to have nuclear power is to ensure sovereignty and insecurity from the imbalance of power comparing with India.
6. Conflict management/resolution strategies and outcomes In January 1948, the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948), establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a ceasefire line to be supervised by the observers. On 30 March 1951, following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council decided that The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir. UNMOGIP’s functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of ceasefire violations and submit its finding to each party and to the Secretary-General. Following the 1972 India-Pakistan agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir, India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position. Given that disagreement, the Secretary-General’s position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same mandate and functions.[i] United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) decided to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir by the democratic method of the free and impartial plebiscite, which was not respected by Indian government because such a plebiscite means losing the territory. In 1948 and again in 1949, the United Nations passed two resolutions in which the Kashmir people were promised the right to determine their own future through a free and impartial plebiscite. These resolutions were never implemented. Hence the resolution made by UN has proved itself ineffective in the perspective of Kashmir conflict. Askandar (2003: 29) has explained why resolution is not always effective, “…resolution is sometimes not enough to ultimately end a conflict…using the techniques of conflicts resolution merely perpetuates the conflict due to its inadequacies…”. Couple of UN resolution in Kashmir conflict has left the issue unresolved though temporarily it reduced the intensity of violence. The United States urged India and Pakistan to stop their armed conflict in Kashmir but made no offer to mediate. Asian Political News (1998: 1) has reported, “Rubin said the U.S. has no immediate plan to mediate between the two countries…”. India strongly oppose for involving third party mediation. Though Pakistan is enthusiastic about third party engagement, India refuses any chance of third party’s role in Kashmir. U.S. encourages both parties to keep themselves away from war but does not want to play an active role. European Union does not have any strong involvement in mediating the Kashmir conflict. India has never accepted third party negotiator and Pakistan has never been trusted by India. Thus the Conflict management strategy has consisted of numerous dialogues between the two countries along with distrust. There is no significant outcome in the Kashmir conflict because India and Pakistan has always been there as enemy of each other with disbelief and hatred. They blamed each other and ended the dialogues without some concrete agreement and decisions. None of them has taken initiatives to transform the conflict in innovative way or to find strategy for ending violence. They made cease-fire numerous times and broke it in the same fashion. Violence in Kashmir has intensified over the decades because of the lack of initiatives. Dialogue, peace process and cease-fire had gone in vain and tension across the LoC fueled the conflict again and again. Even though India has secular democracy, in Kashmir India plays authoritarian role to dominate self-determination by any means. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has already proved itself an ineffective regional body to resolve conflict as well as to strengthen economy. The failure of SAARC for not emerging as a good mediator is the lack of consensus among the members because of India’s reluctance to allow SAARC. As a super power India holds enough control over the decisions of such a regional body. Indian government has shut downed windows for non-formal sector, non-government groups and individuals, religious leaders and academicians in Kashmir. Anybody talking about independence or separation of Kashmir is considered as the traitor of the state. Civil society in India is divided, a small part of it has courage to be critical about government policy but the large part is moved by nationalism that does not allow speaking on behalf of Kashmiris who are separatists. If India would have agreed for plebiscite, as called for in a 1949 U.N. resolution, the conflict could be resolved in a peaceful manner but the reality is cruel as the formula of resolution does not work because India wants to have win situation rather than losing Kashmir.
7. Success and Failure of conflict management There is no remarkable success story in managing the conflict in Kashmir. In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease fire line that would be supervised by the observers, which was the first noticeable success in stopping cross boarder tension. Security Council, by its resolution 91 (1951) decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir, which indicated UN’s initiatives regarding the conflict. In July1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir that can be considered as a temporary step to stop violence. 1949 U.N. resolution was a good try to denote the future of Kashmir in a democratic way that suggested the residents of Jammu and Kashmir would vote for deciding. In my opinion, the resolution was good enough to resolve the conflict. India was the obstacle against the resolution and dismissed the chance to resolve conflict. It is also reasonable why India does not agree for plebiscite, as it may lead Kashmiris to separate from India. Hence UN has failed over the last fifty years to resolve or transform conflict of Kashmir.
Asian Political News (2002:1) has reported that, “A Pakistani
special envoy voiced expectations that Japan will make further efforts
to alleviate the current tension between…”. Pakistan has always
welcomed third party negotiators as the bilateral dialogue with India. The Muslim population of Kashmir has organized an umbrella organization consisting of 33 political parties. It is called the All Parties (Hurriyat) Freedom Conference. It was formed to conduct dialogue with Indian government. The government behaved worse with the organization. They have refused all dialogs with the organization and have beaten and imprisoned its leaders. Hence a democratic initiative to resolve conflict has resulted in harassment, insulation and ill judgment committed by Indian government against the political parties in Kashmir. It is comparable to structural violence done by Indian governments against Kashmiris, which is explained by Galtung (1998), “…structural violence may be as bad as, or worse than, direct violence. People die or lead miserable lives because they are politically repressed, or economically exploited, or deprived of the freedom…” It can be simply assumed from this analysis how difficult it is to resolve the Kashmir conflict as any peace process initiated inside the state can be brutally suppressed and third party intervention can be colored as interference in to sovereign state like India.
Conclusion Muslim leaders and militants of Kashmir have already lost their faith at Indian government after being suppressed, beaten and jailed when they came up with democratic and political approach to resolve conflict. Hence the Kashmiris do not have voice to raise the issue that may threat territorial integrity of India. Kashmiris desire for Pakistani involvement in resolving the conflict has intensified after the Indian government has undermined them. Another mistake of Indian government is that, they have employed fanatic Hindu leaders especially L.K. Advani in the bilateral talks, who is never trusted by the Muslims in India. Even these leaders spread hatred against Muslims and show their prejudices through their speeches and statements. They also play stimulating role in spreading communal violence in India. India blames that Pakistan encourages cross boarder terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan officially denies all the blames of India except their moral support for the militants. Militants in Kashmir are mostly driven by the economic and political frustration. They are not the fanatic Muslims or holy warrior. They are fighting for the independence from oppression of Indian government. Though Indian government claims few terrorist network might have been active in Kashmir, Kashmiris have been fighting for political freedom. Pakistan is still holding long standing points of plebiscite that allows Kashmiris to choose either Pakistan or India. Many Kashmiri Muslims would prefer to be independent of both India and Pakistan. As the bilateral dialogue does not work, third party negotiation is not accepted by India, and Kashmiris does not have voice and political freedom, conflict management strategies are precisely helpless within the rigid conspiracy political structure of India and Pakistan
Recommendation It is also recommended to reduce the distrust between leaders of India and Pakistan. Especially the Elite Hindu leaders of India do not have respect for leaders of Kashmir. The elite leaders have negligence against Muslims of Kashmir besides disbelief for Pakistani leaders. In such a distrustful situation, training programs or workshops can be organized to boost up faith for each party towards another party. Education, training, and advocacy program for leaders of both countries can be an alternate way to improve tolerance and trust. Improve or bring changes in the behavior of the political leaders can be effective means for conflict management in Kashmir. A regional body can play important role to mitigate conflicts. European Union could be a role model to develop a regional mechanism that can open up windows of opportunities in South Asia. ASEAN has proved itself as a useful body for escalating trade, business and economic activities in the South East Asia. A regional body’s success depends on the principle of consensus among its members. Principle of non-interference was equally important for the development of ASEAN. From the light of these regional bodies, strengthening SAARC or developing the similar kind with deferent mission could be an approach in South Asia to deal with the regional conflicts. Being nuclear power, India and Pakistan have developed huge power gap with other countries in South Asia, which has left the SAARC as a useless body. There is a doubt whether the concept of regional body fits within a regional structure where imbalance of power, economy and lack of consensus exist. I agree with Galtung’s idea of creating a new reality, an ‘empirical reality’ that may lead a possibility to transform conflict in to a peaceful solution, Galtung (1998) says, “…the conflict between two countries over a disputed territory may end by one winning in a military or court battle, by a compromise dividing the territory, by both of them withdrawing their claims, leaving the territory to somebody else (such as the inhabitants!), or by the two owning the territory together. Clearly only the last outcome transcends empirical reality; the others conform to the formula that each square kilometre is owned by one state alone…”. Galtung’s idea of transcending empirical reality can be experimented on Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. It could be more effective to motivate the leaders of all three parties to sit at the table to have some prospective discussion over the issues. Leaders of the Indian government should show respect to the leaders of Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistani leaders have to be more considerate about what is good for Kashmiri people rather than their own benefit. Indian leaders should have the mentality for not wining at all situations. These leaders should understand that violence culture results more violence, catastrophe and loss of lives. In addition, the leaders should have the acceptance for new creative approaches and ideas to transform conflict for the better future of South Asia. Askandar, Kamarulzaman (2003) ‘Management and Resolution of Inter-state Conflicts in Southeast Asia’, Malaysia: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN). Asian Political News (August 10, 1998) ‘U.S. urges India, Pakistan to stop Kashmir conflict’, available at, http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m0WDQ/1998_August_10/53000374/p1/article.jhtml, accessed on February 23, 2004 Asian Political News (June 24, 2002) ‘Pakistan hopes for Japan’s role to settle Kashmir conflict’, available at , accessed on February 23, 2004 Galtung, Johan (1998) ‘Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)’, A Manual Prepared by the Crisis Environments Training Initiative and the Disaster Management Training Programme of the United Nations, UN Crisis Environments Training Initiative (CETI) and the Disaster Management Training Programme (DMTP), available at http://www.transcend.org/CONFLENG.HTM, accessed on April 05, 2004. Indurthy, Rathnam (July, 2003) ‘Seeking an end to the Kashmir Quagmire: can India and Pakistan be brought to the table to resolve the conflict that has been ongoing for more than half a century? (Worldview)’, USA Today (Magazine), available at, http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1272/2698_132/104971297/p1/article.jhtml, accessed on February 23, 2004. Kashmir Map, The University of Texas at Austin, General Libraries, available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_disputed_2003.jpg, accessed on March 02, 2004. Mehta, Suketu (July-August, 2003) ‘Too beautiful for death: vital to two nuclear powers, Kashmir is the epicenter of the world’s most dangerous conflict’, Mother Jones, available at , accessed on February 23, 2004 Ramesh, Randeep (2004) ‘Kahmir edges a step closer to peace’, Just Commentary, Malaysia Schematic map of disputed Kashmir, Embassy of India, Washington D.C., available at http://www.indianembassy.org/new/Kargil/J&K_Map.html, March 02, 2004. Shuja, Sharif (Oct, 2002) ‘The conflict in Kashmir’, Contemporary Review, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2242/1641_281/93827716/p1/article.jhtml, accessed on March 02, 2004. Singh, Nirvikar, ‘Cultural Conflict in India: Punjab and Kashmir’, University of California, Santa Cruz available at, http://repositories.cdlib.org/uciaspubs/research/98/10/, accessed on March 02, 2004.
End Notes [ii] US denies to play the role of a mediator that indicates US’s reluctance to engage in Kashmir conflict to resolve it. For detail see, http://ushome.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/28pak1.htm, accessed on March 02, 2004.  Add as favourites (0) |  Quote this article on your site | Views: 1128
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| Last Updated ( Sunday, 21 September 2008 ) | ||||
